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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report

Nyerere's Plans for Tanzania

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NYERERE'S PLANS FOR TANZANIA

Although many African states avow socialist aims, Tanzania is one of the few to move from rhetoric to practice. With his Declaration at Arusha in 1967, President Nyerere committed his ruling party to mitigating social and economic inequalities between urban and rural inhabitants and between the governing elite and the masses. Since then he has proposed radical changes in the school system to make it more relevant for the country's overwhelmingly rural population and has adopted a rural development program based on communalized farming.

A slow but determined effort is being made to carry out Nyerere's ideas. Several ujamaa (socialist) villages—the backbone of his approach to socialism and rural development—have been set up, and major revisions in the curriculum and organization of primary and secondary schools are now in the planning or experimental stage. Because the government has very limited funds and few trained people, progress will continue to be slow and uncertain, but political leaders are under little popular pressure to move faster. In fact, one of the main problems is to try to convince the deeply conservative and tradition-minded peasantry of the need for change.

Of almost equal importance to Nyerere is the liberation struggle against the white-ruled states of southern Africa. As his government has become more deeply involved in supporting the African insurgent movements, he has grown fearful that the white governments will eventually retaliate militarily. Consequently, Tanzania is planning to expand its defense forces and acquire more sophisticated weapons. Unable to obtain modern arms cheaply from either the Soviet Union or the West, Nyerere has turned increasingly to Communist China, which has been willing to provide military and economic aid on unusually favorable terms.

UJAMAA: THE BASIS OF TANZANIAN SOCIALISM

Socialism, like democracy, is an attitude of mind.

-Julius K. Nyerere

Tanzania's socialist experiment cannot be understood apart from the ideas and personality of President Julius Nyerere. Central to his thinking is the concept of ujamaa. Nyerere rejects both capitalism and "scientific" socialism as unsuitable



President Julius Nyerere

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and alien to Africa. Instead, he maintains that Africa's traditional society, which he considers intrinsically egalitarian and democratic, can serve as a guide to building a new society. Work, cooperation, sharing, equality, and communal democracy, which he asserts are part of traditional life, must also be part of socialist life.

From independence in 1961 to the Arusha Declaration in 1967, however, Nyerere's plans to build socialism were ill-defined. He tried to involve the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and through TANU, the peasantry in such cooperative efforts as road and school construction and in setting up communal farming villages. In 1961 his government also embarked on a crash program to expand and diversify the country's already thriving cooperative marketing movement.

These efforts, however, were not very successful. Although some peasants benefited from the government's economic development efforts and a few began to increase their individual holdings and to hire labor, the vast majority of farmers continued to eke out a living near subsistence level. By 1966, moreover, the problem of urban unemployment, already severe in some West African states, had begun to emerge in Tanzania. These trends toward social stratification rather than equitable development in both urban and rural areas deeply disturbed Nyerere.

Nyerere was equally upset about the spread of elite attitudes among the educated. Although he had tried to imbue these people with his own dedication to frugality and honesty in public service, he saw them becoming a privileged and self-serving class. This was sharply brought home to him in October 1966 when the students at University College in Dar es Salaam demonstrated against the terms of national service. They had been asked to give six months to military training

and subsequently to serve 18 months in government jobs they would have occupied anyway—but at only 40 percent of the established salary. Even though their education had been paid for by the state, they protested.

Shocked and angered, Nyerere dismissed the protestors from the school. Then in quick succession he cut his own salary and that of other high government and party officials, civil servants, and army officers to emphasize the importance of national service. Although these measures were strictly aimed at the elite, they also set the stage for the Arusha Declaration.



Nyerere practicing what he preaches

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THE ARUSHA DECLARATION

TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; this struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity.

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited, and disregarded. Now we want a revolution—a revolution which brings to an end our weakness—so that we never again are exploited, oppressed, or humiliated.

--The Arusha Declaration
5 February 1967

In late January 1967 Nyerere met with other TANU leaders at Arusha, a small town in northern Tanzania. The outcome of their deliberations was the Arusha Declaration, a statement of TANU's policy of socialism and self-reliance. Over the next several months Nyerere issued two more policy papers—Education for Self-Reliance and Socialism and Rural Development—which, with the Arusha Declaration, set forth the core of present policies.

The declaration called on the government to take several steps: 1) to consolidate control over the "major means of production"; 2) to prepare development plans the country could carry out without being overly dependent on foreign loans and grants; 3) to ensure that incomes in the private and public sectors were on a par; and 4) to improve the living standards of the peasantry TANU was called on to make sure that party members, and particularly the leaders, adhered to TANU's socialist principles; the party was to set up a program to train its leaders to carry out the government's policies.

The first of these objectives was accomplished easily. The day after the declaration was announced, Nyerere nationalized foreign-owned commercial banks, import-export firms, and insurance companies, and took over the largest industries and agricultural estates. Although there were some short-term dislocations, the government has managed these enterprises fairly well.

More important politically, the government set down strict conflict-of-interest rules for political leaders. Not only are the leaders expected to promote socialism, they must also set a personal example. To ensure that they do, they are required by law to divest themselves of all outside business interests—shares and directorships in privately owned companies, rental properties, and extra salaries—or resign. Nearly 13,000 elected officials and civil servants have had to comply with these rules. Although many of them are unhappy, party leaders have strongly supported Nyerere on this point, and the few party members that have been openly critical have either resigned or been ousted from TANU.

Since Arusha, the government has also tried to exert greater control over the distribution of income, particularly between urban and rural areas. It has put into effect price and wage guidelines, reformed the tax structure, and abolished several local levies. As a result, the tax burden is being shifted away from the largely subsistence-level rural sector and onto those in urban areas who are better able to pay the costs of development. Moreover, the major emphasis of the new five-year plan (1969-74) is on rural development. The government intends to allocate almost three times as much of total development funds to agriculture in this plan as it did in the last one, or about \$76 million.

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SOCIALISM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Others try to reach the moon. We try to reach the villages.
-Julius K. Nyerere

In line with renewed emphasis on rural development, Nyerere has called for major reforms in education. Tanzania, like other African states, inherited from the colonial authorities a school system that catered essentially to the elite. Although some modifications have been made, the system has retained its elite character. Only about a fifth of the children now entering school, for example, can expect to go beyond the primary level, and the curriculum is tailored mainly to preparing a few for university or technical training. Most students, therefore, have received a largely irrelevant education.

In Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere argued that the schools should promote equality and help improve rural life rather than alienate the students from it. He has proposed changes that will prepare most students for rural living. He has told them to grow their own food, to produce some for market, and to help in other ways to maintain their schools. He has encouraged the teachers to let the students plan and run their own experimental farm plots. He has also recommended that the examination system be de-emphasized to make cooperation, not competition, the basis of education.

A determined effort is being made to carry out these ideas. Agricultural courses have been introduced in all primary schools; and civic courses stressing the Arusha Declaration are being given to secondary students. Some schools have also set up experimental farm plots. Because of the lack of funds and trained personnel, however, many of the Ministry of Education's plans are still

in the discussion or experimental stage. Provisions for in-service training for teachers are being made because few of them have had any agricultural training; and during the next five years, the ministry intends to revise the primary school curriculum completely. Major changes in the secondary schools, however, will not begin before 1976.

Along with school reform, Nyerere has called for a more broadly based, concerted effort to increase cooperative and communal village farming. Regional party leaders are now setting up ujamaa villages, and TANU is running "socialist seminars" for grass-roots and middle-level party leaders, civil servants, teachers, national servicemen, villagers, and others to show them how to carry out the Arusha Declaration. The government at the same time is focusing its agricultural extension efforts and rural development funds on these villages to try to make them work.

The success of this program, however, depends largely on local leaders below the regional level, where the governing structure is still weak. Local party and government officials simply lack the training, financial resources, and staff to do an effective job, and the government in Dar es Salaam is capable of giving only limited help. Most peasants, moreover, stubbornly resist efforts to change their traditional way of life.




Ujamaa village in southern Tanzania

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The most successful socialist villages to date are concerned with cattle and tobacco growing in northwest Tanzania. Many other such villages reportedly exist throughout the country; one foreign adviser has said there are as many as 500 of them. The actual number of cooperative farming ventures is difficult to determine, however, because the term "ujamaa village" is used loosely to cover all kinds of experimental farming projects, old and new. Nearly 300 of these villages, moreover, have been organized by the Tanzanian Army along the Mozambique border. Basically strategic hamlets, they are modeled somewhat after the Israeli kibbutz as a first line of defense in case Portuguese forces should try to retaliate against Tanzania for supporting Mozambique insurgents.

THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Aid to the African liberation movements in their struggle against white-ruled states ranks in Nyerere's view just behind social and economic development at home. Although he would prefer a peaceful evolution of majority African rule in these areas, he has become convinced that only the use of force will ultimately bring an end to white domination.

Because Nyerere is uncompromisingly committed to the liberation struggle, Tanzania has become deeply involved in supporting guerrilla insurgency. Tanzanian officials head the African Liberation Committee, the main conduit for African aid to the insurgents; and the Nyerere government is providing arms, money, training, staging bases, and logistical support. In conjunction with Zambia, Tanzania is also planning to build the 1,000-mile Tan-Zam railroad from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam in order to free Zambia from its heavy dependence on the railway systems of Rhodesia, Portuguese Mozambique, and Angola. Fearful of military retaliation from these states, both countries are currently planning to bolster their defense forces.

More than any other foreign power, Communist China has been willing to support Tanzania in these efforts. The Chinese have provided substantial quantities of small arms and ammunition and some guerrilla training to the insurgents. In addition, Peking has provided considerable economic aid, which has been funneled into building a \$7-million textile mill as well as an experimental farm, a farm implements factory, a dam project, two radio stations, and a joint shipping line. When Nyerere was unable to obtain aid for the Tan-Zam railroad from Western sources, Peking quickly offered to build it under an interest-free loan. The favorable terms and the speed with which the Chinese have completed preliminary work on the project have deeply impressed the Tanzanians. Construction of the rail line, which is expected to begin shortly, could eventually bring as many as 5,000 Chinese technicians and workers into Tanzania and Zambia.

The Chinese have also given the Tanzanian Army and police large quantities of arms and materiel, largely free of cost. This aid has included trucks, antiaircraft guns, medium tanks, engineering equipment, patrol boats, and landing craft, and enough small arms for 20,000 men. The Chinese have also built an arms repair facility in Dar es Salaam and a \$1-million police training school at Moshi.

A Canadian team had handled most of the army's basic training and staff work until recently. Nyerere, however, told the Canadians they had done their job so well that they were no longer needed. The Tanzanians apparently intend to do their own staff work and most of their own training. As the country's defense forces expand, however, the training role of the Chinese will increase. At the moment, they are involved only in training a couple of tank and engineering companies and instructing the police in weapons handling and guerrilla warfare tactics. Peking has already agreed, however, to help build a naval

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force and naval facilities at the port of Dar es Salaam and to train naval recruits; it has offered to provide an air defense system as well. If a formal agreement is reached, it will almost certainly be asked to train Tanzanian pilots.

The Chinese have been discreet as well as generous. They have engaged in little of the blatant propagandizing and none of the heavy handedness that have often characterized their aid elsewhere. As a result, they have neither offended nor alarmed anyone but instead have made some influential friends, particularly in the Tanzanian Defense Ministry. Officials there have argued strongly in favor of Chinese aid. Nyerere himself apparently believes that Chinese aid is vital, perhaps even indispensable, to the liberation struggle.

The Chinese probably hope to erode, and if possible to eliminate, Western and Soviet influence in Tanzania and to gain paramount influence in the southern liberation movements. If these presently ineffective groups should become a serious threat to the white governments, the Chinese would then be in a position to extend their influence southward. They have already made some significant inroads in Tanzania. With the Tan-Zam railroad project, they have become the country's largest aid donor, and, with the departure of the Canadians, the way is left open for them to gain predominance in the army as well.

One of the main obstacles in the path of the Chinese, however, is Nyerere himself. So far, his interests and theirs have dovetailed nicely, but his desire to keep Tanzania nonaligned is genuine. Although he is grateful to the Chinese for their aid and shares some of their ideological views, he clearly does not want them influencing his policies. At times, he has gone out of his way to warn them that Tanzania makes its own policy and that he will tolerate no outside interference. By the

same token, he has reminded those in the West who have expressed alarm over his close relations with Peking that it is China, and not the West, that has been willing to help him.

Because the Chinese have a near monopoly on military aid, however, and because their role in the military seems certain to grow, they could eventually pose a serious threat to Nyerere's hold on power or his use of it. Nyerere seems aware of this danger, and willing to take the risk to obtain the kind of aid he believes Tanzania must have.

OUTLOOK

The Arusha Declaration is a declaration of intent. [It] lays down a policy of revolution by evolution.

--Julius K. Nyerere

It is too soon to judge whether the Nyerere government will succeed or fail in its efforts to build socialism in Tanzania. It faces enormous problems of inertia and underdevelopment. With the Arusha Declaration and the policies that have stemmed from it, a beginning has been made. Progress, however, will be extremely slow and uncertain. The successful implementation of these policies will, to a great extent, depend on the leaders' ability to instill in party members and civil servants a strong sense of commitment to present policies. TANU's ability to mobilize the peasantry is also a crucial factor.

Much will depend on the continuing leadership of Nyerere himself, because he is the driving force behind Tanzania's socialist effort. Although party leaders strongly support him, it is questionable whether they are as firmly committed to his reforms and would carry them out as vigorously if something happened to him. Although his most likely successor, Vice President Kawawa, is a good

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administrator and a tough politician, he is not as capable intellectually, nor does he have Nyerere's prestige and popularity. It is doubtful that he would move as strongly against corruption and the elite as has Nyercre or that he could effectively carry on Nyerere's programs.

How Nyerere handles the Chinese will also be important. Thus far, Tanzania has obtained much from Peking for little in return. A crucial challenge to Nyerere could come if the Chinese gain a strong foothold in the military, such as the staff and training positions that the Canadians held. Nyerere probably wants to keep them out of these slots, and many army officers, who are Western trained, certainly reel the same way. If the Tanzanians are unable to manage their military forces, however, the Chinese may well be called on to help.

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